![]() Touchscreen, physical keyboard, optical pad ( August 2022) ( Learn how and when to remove this template message)ĬDMA EVDO Rev. Several templates and tools are available to assist in formatting, such as Reflinks ( documentation), reFill ( documentation) and Citation bot ( documentation). Please consider converting them to full citations to ensure the article remains verifiable and maintains a consistent citation style. I focus on the tactical level, but otherwise none of the principles I introduce is really new it is simply a question of interpreting and applying the existing COIN principles.This article uses bare URLs, which are uninformative and vulnerable to link rot. Based on the Dutch experiences in Uruzgan I introduce a model for executing the hold-phase. ![]() In my view – and views of many others - this is the most crucial phase, but also the one which is the most difficult to execute. Therefore, I thought it would be worthwhile to look once again, and more deeply, at the complexity of ‘holding’ areas after ‘clearing’. This comes as no surprise as troops throughout Afghanistan were confronted with the same effects when the cleared areas were not hold thereafter. One of our most important conclusions is that clearing operations had very limited positive effects and mainly negative effects, if carried out on their own. ![]() de Graaf, we considered the efforts, the operations and the lessons learned by analyzing three operations in Uruzgan: operation ‘Perth’ in July 2006 ‘Spin Ghar’ (White Mountain) in October 2007 and ‘Tura Ghar’ (Sabre Mountain) in January 2009, all three of which were conducted in the Baluchi valley in Uruzgan. In a recently published article about the performance of the Dutch forces in Uruzgan, which I wrote together with Dr. Initially, the contribution after August had been discussed fiercely, but the collapse of the Netherlands’ coalition government in February 2010 meant also the end of the discussion about prolongation of the mission of Task Force Uruzgan the withdrawal of troops is definite and more or less completed by the time of writing. In August 2010, the Dutch redeployed their forces after being active in Afghanistan for four years, aiding and abetting ISAF with around 2000 troops each rotation. The main objective of this study is to show the existence and plausibility of different explanations, and also therefore, to add to the breadth of conceptual tools practitioners should understand when they find themselves thrown into irregular war. While we can't decisively evaluate the efficacy of COIN doctrine in Iraq here, it is important to realize that there are greatly different potential explanations for the actual conduct and course of the war, which furthermore differ by region. COIN doctrine drive outcomes on the ground, or are there alternate explanations for these outcomes? That is, if correlation is not causation, then what else explains the course of the war in Iraq? To answer these questions, we introduce a specific analytical framework-describing the mechanisms which shift populations into differing degrees of insurgent or counterinsurgent behavior-to guide the selection of facts, topics, and subjects in the sections that follow, as well as to identify important open questions and data requirements needed to evaluate them. We begin with the overarching question: Did the implementation of U.S. The correlation of Iraq’s plunging violence in 2007 with rising force levels (the surge) and a new set of counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics offered a tempting recipe for success in irregular warfare.
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